Adds the unauthenticated surface that's needed to invite outsiders:
- Landing (/) — dual-purpose root: dashboard for logged-in users,
landing for everyone else. New maybe_current_user soft-auth helper
in app/auth.py supports it without disturbing the per-route
require_token deps on /news, /log, /upload, /settings.
- About, Pricing, Disclaimer, Terms, Privacy — own router
(app/routers/public.py), no auth dep, shared public_base layout
(brand link, thin nav, footer with legal links + ICO ref + date).
- Editorial positioning: news aggregator with a macro brain; tagline
"Understand markets. Don't gamble on them."; anti-trading-as-gambling
stance carried through About and Landing.
Legal pass following an independent lawyer-style review:
- Privacy: explicit UK-GDPR Art. 6 lawful-basis section; Art. 22
automated-decision line; explicit consent for sessionStorage sync
key (PECR); 30-day IP-log retention; Art. 21 objection right;
Children clause; Art. 33/34 breach-notification clause;
international-transfer mechanism (IDTA + UK Addendum). ICO
registration ZC098928 surfaced at the top.
- Pricing: paid-card AI-portfolio-analysis bullet rewritten to remove
advice-shaped wording ("what would invalidate the posture" gone);
added italic carve-out citing FSMA / FCA COBS.
- Disclaimer: separate EU/EEA carve-out + MAR 596/2014 Art. 3(1)(34)
commentator safe-harbour; "qualifies the Terms" line; hallucination
wording fixed.
- Terms: cl.4 explicit AI-training prohibition + harassment line;
cl.5 CCR 2013 14-day cancellation; cl.7 softened AI copyright
claim under CDPA s.9(3) ambiguity; cl.8 proportionate suspension +
pro-rata refund for paid users; cl.10 CRA 2015 Pt 1 statutory-rights
carve-out from the liability cap; cl.11 right to close account on
material change; cl.12 non-exclusive jurisdiction + UK consumer
local courts.
Code-side enforcement of the Privacy claim:
- openrouter.py: outbound OpenRouter calls now carry
X-OR-Allow-Training: false. DeepSeek doesn't expose a per-request
flag; the Privacy page discloses this caveat verbatim.
Apex domain prep:
- branding.APP_URL flipped to https://read.markets (was app.). DNS for
the apex already resolves; pending operator NPM step is a cert that
covers the bare apex + a 301 from app.read.markets. No hard-coded
subdomain references remain in code (verified with grep).
Nav + chrome:
- app dropdown gains Pricing / Terms / Privacy / Disclaimer links.
- login.html gains a small legal-links footer for the
highest-leverage moment to surface them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
207 lines
7.6 KiB
Python
207 lines
7.6 KiB
Python
"""Request-level authentication.
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Two paths accepted:
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1. **Session cookie** (`cassandra_session`) — set by /login. Signed with
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`CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET` via itsdangerous; carries just the user id.
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On each request we deserialise, then load the User from the DB so the
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tier value is always fresh.
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2. **Bearer token** (`Authorization: Bearer …`) — the legacy single-user
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path kept as an admin/dev escape hatch and for programmatic API access
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(CLI, curl, scripts). Matches `CASSANDRA_TOKEN` if set.
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If neither matches:
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- HTML requests get 303 → /login
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- API / curl-style requests get 401
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For backwards-compat, `require_token` is an alias for `require_auth` so
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existing routers that do `dependencies=[Depends(require_token)]` keep
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working without edit.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from fastapi import Header, HTTPException, Request, status
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from itsdangerous import BadSignature, SignatureExpired, URLSafeTimedSerializer
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from app.config import get_settings
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from app.db import get_session_factory
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from app.models import User
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from app.services.auth_service import get_user
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "cassandra_session"
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SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60 # 14 days
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# Short-lived cookie set during signup / unverified-login. Carries the email
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# under verification so the /verify page knows who's verifying without making
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# the user retype the address. NOT an auth cookie — never grants access to
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# anything beyond /verify and /verify/resend.
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PENDING_COOKIE_NAME = "cassandra_pending"
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PENDING_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60 # 1 hour
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@dataclass
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class CurrentUser:
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"""The authenticated principal for the current request.
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`user` is None when the bearer token was used (admin/dev path with no
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matching DB row). Routes that need per-user scoping should check
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`is_admin` and either use a sentinel admin scope or 403."""
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is_admin: bool
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user: User | None
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@property
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def id(self) -> int | None:
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return self.user.id if self.user else None
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@property
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def email(self) -> str | None:
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return self.user.email if self.user else None
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def _serializer() -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:
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s = get_settings()
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secret = s.CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET or s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN or "dev-insecure-secret"
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return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret, salt="cassandra-session-v1")
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def sign_session(user_id: int) -> str:
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return _serializer().dumps({"uid": int(user_id)})
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def verify_session(cookie: str) -> int | None:
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try:
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data = _serializer().loads(cookie, max_age=SESSION_TTL_SECONDS)
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return int(data["uid"])
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except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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def _pending_serializer() -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:
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s = get_settings()
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secret = s.CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET or s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN or "dev-insecure-secret"
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return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret, salt="cassandra-pending-v1")
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def sign_pending(email: str, user_id: int, ref: str | None = None) -> str:
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"""Signed payload for the pending-verify cookie. Carries the email
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+ user_id under verification, and optionally a referral code captured
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at signup (so it survives the GET → POST → /verify hop)."""
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payload: dict = {"email": email, "uid": int(user_id)}
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if ref:
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payload["ref"] = ref
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return _pending_serializer().dumps(payload)
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def verify_pending(cookie: str) -> dict | None:
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"""Returns {"email": str, "uid": int, "ref": str|None} or None if
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signature/expiry bad."""
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try:
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data = _pending_serializer().loads(cookie, max_age=PENDING_TTL_SECONDS)
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return {
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"email": str(data["email"]),
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"uid": int(data["uid"]),
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"ref": data.get("ref"),
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}
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except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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def _wants_html(request: Request) -> bool:
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accept = request.headers.get("accept", "").lower()
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# Treat a missing Accept header as HTML for browser navigations.
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if not accept:
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return True
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return "text/html" in accept and "application/json" not in accept
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async def require_auth(
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request: Request,
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authorization: str | None = Header(default=None),
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) -> CurrentUser:
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"""Resolve the current authenticated principal. Raises HTTPException
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on failure (303 redirect to /login for HTML, 401 for API)."""
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s = get_settings()
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# --- 1) Bearer token (admin / dev / scripts) ---
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if s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN and authorization and authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
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provided = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1].strip()
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if secrets.compare_digest(provided.encode(), s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN.encode()):
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=True, user=None)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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# --- 2) Session cookie (browser) ---
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cookie = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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if cookie:
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uid = verify_session(cookie)
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if uid is not None:
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async with get_session_factory()() as db_session:
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user = await get_user(db_session, uid)
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if user is not None:
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=False, user=user)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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# --- 3) Unauthenticated ---
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if _wants_html(request):
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# Preserve the originally-requested path so /login can redirect back.
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path = request.url.path
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if request.url.query:
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path += "?" + request.url.query
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return _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path=path)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Authentication required",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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async def maybe_current_user(
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request: Request,
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authorization: str | None = Header(default=None),
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) -> CurrentUser | None:
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"""Soft-auth: same resolution as `require_auth`, but returns None on
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miss instead of raising. Used on dual-purpose routes (e.g. `/` where
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a logged-in user sees the dashboard and a logged-out visitor sees the
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landing page) and on the public marketing/legal pages, so their
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templates can show a "Dashboard" link when a session is present."""
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s = get_settings()
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if s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN and authorization and authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
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provided = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1].strip()
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if secrets.compare_digest(provided.encode(), s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN.encode()):
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=True, user=None)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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cookie = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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if cookie:
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uid = verify_session(cookie)
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if uid is not None:
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async with get_session_factory()() as db_session:
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user = await get_user(db_session, uid)
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if user is not None:
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=False, user=user)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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return None
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def _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path: str = "/") -> None:
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# Some pages (login itself) are paths a redirect loop would be silly
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# to send back to. The auth router opts out of this dependency
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# entirely, so we don't need to filter here.
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER,
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detail="Login required",
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headers={"Location": f"/login?next={next_path}"},
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)
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# Backwards compatibility: every existing router uses Depends(require_token).
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require_token = require_auth
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