sync: detect orphaned blobs (pepper rotation) + fix AESGCM arg order

Adds an 8-byte HKDF fingerprint of the current pepper to portfolio_sync
rows. On fetch, a mismatch surfaces as 410 Gone (distinct from genuine
GCM corruption → 500), and the UI silently cleans up the dead row and
shows a soft "please re-import" notice instead of a confusing PIN
re-prompt. Legacy rows (pepper_fp NULL) are probed optimistically and
backfilled on success.

Also fixes a latent bug in unwrap(): AESGCM.decrypt args were swapped
(ct, nonce instead of nonce, ct), so restore-from-cloud always failed
even when the pepper was correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Giorgio Gilestro 2026-05-25 12:49:11 +02:00
parent f1903e1e61
commit 5c7cc4c6aa
8 changed files with 224 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
"""portfolio_sync: add pepper_fp for orphan-blob detection.
When PORTFOLIO_SYNC_PEPPER rotates (intentional or otherwise), any
existing wrapped blob becomes permanently unreadable. Today that
manifests as a GCM InvalidTag 500 on the GET endpoint. We add a
short HKDF-derived fingerprint of the pepper so we can detect the
rotation case explicitly and surface it to the client as a clean
"stale" state (410), distinct from genuine corruption (500).
Existing rows get pepper_fp=NULL on upgrade; the service treats NULL
as "orphaned" (always true: those rows were written before this
column existed, so we can't prove the pepper matches). The next
successful upsert refreshes the fingerprint.
Revision ID: 0016
Revises: 0015
Create Date: 2026-05-25
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
import sqlalchemy as sa
from alembic import op
revision: str = "0016"
down_revision: Union[str, None] = "0015"
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
def upgrade() -> None:
op.add_column(
"portfolio_sync",
sa.Column("pepper_fp", sa.LargeBinary(length=8), nullable=True),
)
def downgrade() -> None:
op.drop_column("portfolio_sync", "pepper_fp")

View file

@ -204,6 +204,10 @@ class PortfolioSync(Base):
updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
fetch_window_start: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
fetch_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
# 8-byte HKDF fingerprint of the pepper that wrapped this row. A
# mismatch against the current pepper means the row is orphaned
# (pepper was rotated) — distinct from genuine GCM corruption.
pepper_fp: Mapped[bytes | None] = mapped_column(LargeBinary(length=8))
class Referral(Base):

View file

@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ class SyncBlobOut(BaseModel):
class SyncStatusOut(BaseModel):
exists: bool
orphaned: bool = False
updated_at: datetime | None = None
@ -73,8 +74,8 @@ async def get_status(
principal: CurrentUser = Depends(require_paid),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
) -> SyncStatusOut:
exists, updated_at = await svc.fetch_status(session, principal.id)
return SyncStatusOut(exists=exists, updated_at=updated_at)
exists, orphaned, updated_at = await svc.fetch_status(session, principal.id)
return SyncStatusOut(exists=exists, orphaned=orphaned, updated_at=updated_at)
@router.post("", response_model=SyncWriteOut)
@ -108,6 +109,15 @@ async def download_blob(
)
try:
result = await svc.fetch(session, principal.id)
except svc.SyncOrphanedError:
# Known state: pepper rotated. The frontend uses 410 to swap the
# restore form for a "stale — re-upload" CTA. Logged at INFO,
# not ERROR, because this isn't a server fault.
log.info("portfolio_sync.orphaned", user_id=principal.id)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_410_GONE,
detail="stale_blob",
)
except svc.SyncCryptoError:
log.error("portfolio_sync.unwrap_failed", user_id=principal.id)
raise HTTPException(

View file

@ -44,8 +44,16 @@ RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 6
class SyncCryptoError(Exception):
"""Outer-wrap decryption failed — usually a pepper change or
bit-rotted row. The router maps this to a 500."""
"""Outer-wrap decryption failed even though the pepper fingerprint
matched i.e. genuine corruption or tampering. The router maps this
to a 500."""
class SyncOrphanedError(Exception):
"""The row was wrapped with a different pepper than the one currently
configured (typically: dev-time pepper rotation). The data is
permanently unrecoverable, but this is a *known* state, not a server
fault the router maps this to a 410 Gone."""
def _utcnow() -> datetime:
@ -72,6 +80,22 @@ def _server_key(user_id: int) -> bytes:
).derive(_pepper_bytes())
_FP_LEN = 8
def current_pepper_fp() -> bytes:
"""8-byte HKDF-derived fingerprint of the current pepper. Doesn't
leak the pepper itself (HKDF is one-way) and is short enough to make
accidental collisions across rotations effectively zero (2^-32 birthday
floor fine for a few-row dev install)."""
return HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=_FP_LEN,
salt=b"portfolio-sync-pepper-fp",
info=b"v1",
).derive(_pepper_bytes())
def wrap(user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
"""Encrypt the client-side ciphertext (`inner_blob`) for storage.
Returns (outer_ct, outer_nonce). The nonce is random per write."""
@ -81,9 +105,15 @@ def wrap(user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
def unwrap(user_id: int, outer_ct: bytes, outer_nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Inverse of wrap(). Raises SyncCryptoError if the GCM tag fails."""
"""Inverse of wrap(). Raises SyncCryptoError if the GCM tag fails.
AESGCM.decrypt takes (nonce, data, associated_data) not
(data, nonce). The original implementation had the arguments
swapped, which meant restore-from-cloud always failed even when
the pepper was correct.
"""
try:
return AESGCM(_server_key(user_id)).decrypt(outer_ct, outer_nonce, None)
return AESGCM(_server_key(user_id)).decrypt(outer_nonce, outer_ct, None)
except Exception as exc: # InvalidTag, malformed ciphertext, etc.
raise SyncCryptoError("outer wrap unwrap failed") from exc
@ -91,6 +121,7 @@ def unwrap(user_id: int, outer_ct: bytes, outer_nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> datetime:
"""Insert or replace this user's sync row. Returns the new updated_at."""
outer_ct, outer_nonce = wrap(user_id, inner_blob)
fp = current_pepper_fp()
now = _utcnow()
row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
if row is None:
@ -101,6 +132,7 @@ async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> date
version=1,
created_at=now,
updated_at=now,
pepper_fp=fp,
)
session.add(row)
else:
@ -109,19 +141,34 @@ async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> date
row.updated_at = now
# Bump version field forward if we ever change the wrap scheme.
row.version = 1
row.pepper_fp = fp
await session.commit()
return now
def _is_orphaned(row: PortfolioSync) -> bool:
"""A row is orphaned when its stored pepper fingerprint is present
and differs from the current pepper's fingerprint. NULL fingerprint
(rows from before the pepper_fp column existed) is treated
optimistically: we don't know whether the pepper rotated, so we let
the fetch path probe with a real unwrap and self-heal on success.
Status returns orphaned=False for NULL so the user is offered the
Restore form; if unwrap then fails, the GET path returns 410 and the
UI flips to the stale state."""
return row.pepper_fp is not None and row.pepper_fp != current_pepper_fp()
async def fetch_status(
session: AsyncSession, user_id: int,
) -> tuple[bool, datetime | None]:
"""Cheap existence check — does NOT decrypt. Used by the dashboard to
decide whether to show the restore prompt."""
) -> tuple[bool, bool, datetime | None]:
"""Cheap existence check — does NOT decrypt. Returns
(exists, orphaned, updated_at). Used by the dashboard to decide
whether to show the restore prompt vs the "stale, re-upload" prompt.
"""
row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
if row is None:
return False, None
return True, row.updated_at
return False, False, None
return True, _is_orphaned(row), row.updated_at
async def fetch(
@ -129,13 +176,36 @@ async def fetch(
) -> tuple[bytes, datetime] | None:
"""Returns (inner_blob, updated_at) or None if sync disabled.
Raises SyncCryptoError if the row exists but the outer wrap is
unreadable (typically: pepper was rotated without re-encrypting).
Raises SyncOrphanedError if the row's pepper fingerprint mismatches
the current pepper, OR if a fingerprint-less legacy row fails to
unwrap (which can only mean a pepper rotation, since the arg-order
bug fix landed alongside the fingerprint column).
Raises SyncCryptoError if the fingerprint matched but the outer wrap
still failed (genuine corruption or tampering).
On a successful unwrap of a fingerprint-less legacy row, the current
pepper's fingerprint is backfilled so subsequent status checks
correctly report healthy (and future rotations are detectable).
"""
row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
if row is None:
return None
inner = unwrap(user_id, row.outer_ciphertext, row.outer_nonce)
if _is_orphaned(row):
raise SyncOrphanedError("pepper fingerprint mismatch")
legacy = row.pepper_fp is None
try:
inner = unwrap(user_id, row.outer_ciphertext, row.outer_nonce)
except SyncCryptoError:
if legacy:
# Legacy row + decrypt fails = pepper rotated before the
# fingerprint column existed. Same observable state as a
# post-fingerprint orphan; report it that way.
raise SyncOrphanedError("legacy row, decrypt failed")
raise
if legacy:
row.pepper_fp = current_pepper_fp()
await session.commit()
return inner, row.updated_at

View file

@ -216,7 +216,23 @@
if (r.status === 402) return { exists: false, paid: false };
if (!r.ok) throw new Error('sync status: HTTP ' + r.status);
const body = await r.json();
return { exists: !!body.exists, updated_at: body.updated_at, paid: true };
return {
exists: !!body.exists,
orphaned: !!body.orphaned,
updated_at: body.updated_at,
paid: true,
};
}
// Thrown by pullSync when the server reports the stored blob is
// wrapped with a different server key (pepper rotation). Distinct
// from BadPinError so the UI can swap the restore form for a
// re-upload CTA instead of asking again for the PIN.
class StaleBlobError extends Error {
constructor(msg) {
super(msg || 'Stored portfolio cannot be decrypted with the current server key.');
this.name = 'StaleBlobError';
}
}
async function pushSync(pie, pin) {
@ -245,6 +261,10 @@
headers: { 'Accept': 'application/json' },
});
if (r.status === 404) return null;
if (r.status === 410) {
const body = await r.json().catch(() => ({}));
throw new StaleBlobError(body.detail);
}
if (!r.ok) {
const body = await r.json().catch(() => ({}));
// 429 → server already throttling; bubble the message up unchanged.
@ -273,6 +293,7 @@
disableSync,
clearCachedKey,
BadPinError,
StaleBlobError,
// Exposed for tests / debugging:
_packBlob: packBlob,
_unpackBlob: unpackBlob,

View file

@ -164,14 +164,52 @@
}[c]));
}
// Tiny one-shot flag the orphan-cleanup path sets so renderEmpty can
// surface a plain-English "your previous backup needs to be re-uploaded"
// line. Read-once; cleared as soon as it's shown.
function consumeBackupExpiredNotice() {
try {
if (sessionStorage.getItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired') === '1') {
sessionStorage.removeItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired');
return true;
}
} catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
return false;
}
function renderEmpty(mount) {
const expired = consumeBackupExpiredNotice();
const notice = expired
? '<div class="settings-row__hint" style="margin-bottom:8px;">' +
'Your previous cloud backup couldn&rsquo;t be restored on this server. ' +
'Please re-upload your portfolio to refresh it.' +
'</div>'
: '';
mount.innerHTML =
'<div class="empty" style="padding:16px;">' +
notice +
'No portfolio loaded in this browser. ' +
'<a href="/settings#import">Import a T212 CSV →</a>' +
'</div>';
}
// Silently remove an unrecoverable cloud blob and re-render. The user
// sees the standard empty state with a soft one-liner — no jargon, no
// extra buttons. The decision to remove is safe: the blob is already
// permanently undecryptable, so we're cleaning up dead state, not
// discarding user data.
async function autoCleanStaleBlob(mount) {
try {
await window.CassandraSync.disableSync();
} catch (e) {
console.warn('cassandra.sync: auto-clean of stale blob failed', e);
}
try {
sessionStorage.setItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired', '1');
} catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
renderEmpty(mount);
}
function renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status) {
const lastSynced = status.updated_at
? new Date(status.updated_at).toISOString().replace('T', ' ').slice(0, 16) + ' UTC'
@ -212,6 +250,12 @@
savePie(pie);
mountAndRender();
} catch (e2) {
if (e2 && e2.name === 'StaleBlobError') {
// Pepper rotated since the blob was written — silently clean
// up and fall through to the empty state with a soft notice.
autoCleanStaleBlob(mount);
return;
}
err.textContent = (e2 && e2.name === 'BadPinError')
? 'Incorrect PIN.'
: (e2.message || 'Could not restore.');
@ -417,7 +461,14 @@
catch (e) { console.warn('sync status check failed', e); }
}
if (status && status.paid && status.exists) {
renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status);
if (status.orphaned) {
// Pepper rotated since the blob was written — clean up
// silently and show the standard empty state with a soft
// "please re-upload" notice.
autoCleanStaleBlob(mount);
} else {
renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status);
}
} else {
renderEmpty(mount);
}

View file

@ -256,7 +256,18 @@
}
const valueEl = statusEl.querySelector('.settings-row__value');
actionsEl.innerHTML = '';
if (status.exists) {
if (status.exists && status.orphaned) {
// The stored blob can no longer be decrypted (server key rotated
// since it was written). The data is permanently unrecoverable,
// so silently clean up the dead row and re-render in the
// standard "off" state — leaving a soft one-liner so the user
// knows why they need to re-import.
try { await window.CassandraSync.disableSync(); }
catch (e) { console.warn('auto-clear stale sync failed', e); }
setFeedback('Your previous cloud backup couldnt be restored. Re-import your portfolio to enable cloud sync again.', true);
await refresh();
return;
} else if (status.exists) {
const when = status.updated_at
? new Date(status.updated_at).toISOString().replace('T', ' ').slice(0, 16) + ' UTC'
: '—';

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ def test_paid_user_round_trip(tmp_path):
# status before any upload
r = client.get("/api/portfolio/sync/status", cookies=cookies)
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json() == {"exists": False, "updated_at": None}
assert r.json() == {"exists": False, "orphaned": False, "updated_at": None}
# upload
blob = os.urandom(512)