sync: detect orphaned blobs (pepper rotation) + fix AESGCM arg order

Adds an 8-byte HKDF fingerprint of the current pepper to portfolio_sync
rows. On fetch, a mismatch surfaces as 410 Gone (distinct from genuine
GCM corruption → 500), and the UI silently cleans up the dead row and
shows a soft "please re-import" notice instead of a confusing PIN
re-prompt. Legacy rows (pepper_fp NULL) are probed optimistically and
backfilled on success.

Also fixes a latent bug in unwrap(): AESGCM.decrypt args were swapped
(ct, nonce instead of nonce, ct), so restore-from-cloud always failed
even when the pepper was correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

app/models.py

@@ -204,6 +204,10 @@ class PortfolioSync(Base):
     updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
     fetch_window_start: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
     fetch_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    # 8-byte HKDF fingerprint of the pepper that wrapped this row. A
+    # mismatch against the current pepper means the row is orphaned
+    # (pepper was rotated) — distinct from genuine GCM corruption.
+    pepper_fp: Mapped[bytes | None] = mapped_column(LargeBinary(length=8))
 
 
 class Referral(Base):

app/routers/sync.py

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ class SyncBlobOut(BaseModel):
 
 class SyncStatusOut(BaseModel):
     exists: bool
+    orphaned: bool = False
     updated_at: datetime | None = None
 
 
@@ -73,8 +74,8 @@ async def get_status(
     principal: CurrentUser = Depends(require_paid),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
 ) -> SyncStatusOut:
-    exists, updated_at = await svc.fetch_status(session, principal.id)
-    return SyncStatusOut(exists=exists, updated_at=updated_at)
+    exists, orphaned, updated_at = await svc.fetch_status(session, principal.id)
+    return SyncStatusOut(exists=exists, orphaned=orphaned, updated_at=updated_at)
 
 
 @router.post("", response_model=SyncWriteOut)
@@ -108,6 +109,15 @@ async def download_blob(
         )
     try:
         result = await svc.fetch(session, principal.id)
+    except svc.SyncOrphanedError:
+        # Known state: pepper rotated. The frontend uses 410 to swap the
+        # restore form for a "stale — re-upload" CTA. Logged at INFO,
+        # not ERROR, because this isn't a server fault.
+        log.info("portfolio_sync.orphaned", user_id=principal.id)
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_410_GONE,
+            detail="stale_blob",
+        )
     except svc.SyncCryptoError:
         log.error("portfolio_sync.unwrap_failed", user_id=principal.id)
         raise HTTPException(

app/services/portfolio_sync.py

@@ -44,8 +44,16 @@ RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 6
 
 
 class SyncCryptoError(Exception):
-    """Outer-wrap decryption failed — usually a pepper change or
-    bit-rotted row. The router maps this to a 500."""
+    """Outer-wrap decryption failed even though the pepper fingerprint
+    matched — i.e. genuine corruption or tampering. The router maps this
+    to a 500."""
+
+
+class SyncOrphanedError(Exception):
+    """The row was wrapped with a different pepper than the one currently
+    configured (typically: dev-time pepper rotation). The data is
+    permanently unrecoverable, but this is a *known* state, not a server
+    fault — the router maps this to a 410 Gone."""
 
 
 def _utcnow() -> datetime:
@@ -72,6 +80,22 @@ def _server_key(user_id: int) -> bytes:
     ).derive(_pepper_bytes())
 
 
+_FP_LEN = 8
+
+
+def current_pepper_fp() -> bytes:
+    """8-byte HKDF-derived fingerprint of the current pepper. Doesn't
+    leak the pepper itself (HKDF is one-way) and is short enough to make
+    accidental collisions across rotations effectively zero (2^-32 birthday
+    floor — fine for a few-row dev install)."""
+    return HKDF(
+        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
+        length=_FP_LEN,
+        salt=b"portfolio-sync-pepper-fp",
+        info=b"v1",
+    ).derive(_pepper_bytes())
+
+
 def wrap(user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
     """Encrypt the client-side ciphertext (`inner_blob`) for storage.
     Returns (outer_ct, outer_nonce). The nonce is random per write."""
@@ -81,9 +105,15 @@ def wrap(user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
 
 
 def unwrap(user_id: int, outer_ct: bytes, outer_nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
-    """Inverse of wrap(). Raises SyncCryptoError if the GCM tag fails."""
+    """Inverse of wrap(). Raises SyncCryptoError if the GCM tag fails.
+
+    AESGCM.decrypt takes (nonce, data, associated_data) — not
+    (data, nonce). The original implementation had the arguments
+    swapped, which meant restore-from-cloud always failed even when
+    the pepper was correct.
+    """
     try:
-        return AESGCM(_server_key(user_id)).decrypt(outer_ct, outer_nonce, None)
+        return AESGCM(_server_key(user_id)).decrypt(outer_nonce, outer_ct, None)
     except Exception as exc:  # InvalidTag, malformed ciphertext, etc.
         raise SyncCryptoError("outer wrap unwrap failed") from exc
 
@@ -91,6 +121,7 @@ def unwrap(user_id: int, outer_ct: bytes, outer_nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
 async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> datetime:
     """Insert or replace this user's sync row. Returns the new updated_at."""
     outer_ct, outer_nonce = wrap(user_id, inner_blob)
+    fp = current_pepper_fp()
     now = _utcnow()
     row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
     if row is None:
@@ -101,6 +132,7 @@ async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> date
             version=1,
             created_at=now,
             updated_at=now,
+            pepper_fp=fp,
         )
         session.add(row)
     else:
@@ -109,19 +141,34 @@ async def upsert(session: AsyncSession, user_id: int, inner_blob: bytes) -> date
         row.updated_at = now
         # Bump version field forward if we ever change the wrap scheme.
         row.version = 1
+        row.pepper_fp = fp
     await session.commit()
     return now
 
 
+def _is_orphaned(row: PortfolioSync) -> bool:
+    """A row is orphaned when its stored pepper fingerprint is present
+    and differs from the current pepper's fingerprint. NULL fingerprint
+    (rows from before the pepper_fp column existed) is treated
+    optimistically: we don't know whether the pepper rotated, so we let
+    the fetch path probe with a real unwrap and self-heal on success.
+    Status returns orphaned=False for NULL so the user is offered the
+    Restore form; if unwrap then fails, the GET path returns 410 and the
+    UI flips to the stale state."""
+    return row.pepper_fp is not None and row.pepper_fp != current_pepper_fp()
+
+
 async def fetch_status(
     session: AsyncSession, user_id: int,
-) -> tuple[bool, datetime | None]:
-    """Cheap existence check — does NOT decrypt. Used by the dashboard to
-    decide whether to show the restore prompt."""
+) -> tuple[bool, bool, datetime | None]:
+    """Cheap existence check — does NOT decrypt. Returns
+    (exists, orphaned, updated_at). Used by the dashboard to decide
+    whether to show the restore prompt vs the "stale, re-upload" prompt.
+    """
     row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
     if row is None:
-        return False, None
-    return True, row.updated_at
+        return False, False, None
+    return True, _is_orphaned(row), row.updated_at
 
 
 async def fetch(
@@ -129,13 +176,36 @@ async def fetch(
 ) -> tuple[bytes, datetime] | None:
     """Returns (inner_blob, updated_at) or None if sync disabled.
 
-    Raises SyncCryptoError if the row exists but the outer wrap is
-    unreadable (typically: pepper was rotated without re-encrypting).
+    Raises SyncOrphanedError if the row's pepper fingerprint mismatches
+    the current pepper, OR if a fingerprint-less legacy row fails to
+    unwrap (which can only mean a pepper rotation, since the arg-order
+    bug fix landed alongside the fingerprint column).
+
+    Raises SyncCryptoError if the fingerprint matched but the outer wrap
+    still failed (genuine corruption or tampering).
+
+    On a successful unwrap of a fingerprint-less legacy row, the current
+    pepper's fingerprint is backfilled so subsequent status checks
+    correctly report healthy (and future rotations are detectable).
     """
     row = await session.get(PortfolioSync, user_id)
     if row is None:
         return None
-    inner = unwrap(user_id, row.outer_ciphertext, row.outer_nonce)
+    if _is_orphaned(row):
+        raise SyncOrphanedError("pepper fingerprint mismatch")
+    legacy = row.pepper_fp is None
+    try:
+        inner = unwrap(user_id, row.outer_ciphertext, row.outer_nonce)
+    except SyncCryptoError:
+        if legacy:
+            # Legacy row + decrypt fails = pepper rotated before the
+            # fingerprint column existed. Same observable state as a
+            # post-fingerprint orphan; report it that way.
+            raise SyncOrphanedError("legacy row, decrypt failed")
+        raise
+    if legacy:
+        row.pepper_fp = current_pepper_fp()
+        await session.commit()
     return inner, row.updated_at
 
 

app/static/js/portfolio-sync.js

@@ -216,7 +216,23 @@
     if (r.status === 402) return { exists: false, paid: false };
     if (!r.ok) throw new Error('sync status: HTTP ' + r.status);
     const body = await r.json();
-    return { exists: !!body.exists, updated_at: body.updated_at, paid: true };
+    return {
+      exists: !!body.exists,
+      orphaned: !!body.orphaned,
+      updated_at: body.updated_at,
+      paid: true,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Thrown by pullSync when the server reports the stored blob is
+  // wrapped with a different server key (pepper rotation). Distinct
+  // from BadPinError so the UI can swap the restore form for a
+  // re-upload CTA instead of asking again for the PIN.
+  class StaleBlobError extends Error {
+    constructor(msg) {
+      super(msg || 'Stored portfolio cannot be decrypted with the current server key.');
+      this.name = 'StaleBlobError';
+    }
   }
 
   async function pushSync(pie, pin) {
@@ -245,6 +261,10 @@
       headers: { 'Accept': 'application/json' },
     });
     if (r.status === 404) return null;
+    if (r.status === 410) {
+      const body = await r.json().catch(() => ({}));
+      throw new StaleBlobError(body.detail);
+    }
     if (!r.ok) {
       const body = await r.json().catch(() => ({}));
       // 429 → server already throttling; bubble the message up unchanged.
@@ -273,6 +293,7 @@
     disableSync,
     clearCachedKey,
     BadPinError,
+    StaleBlobError,
     // Exposed for tests / debugging:
     _packBlob: packBlob,
     _unpackBlob: unpackBlob,

app/static/js/portfolio.js

@@ -164,14 +164,52 @@
     }[c]));
   }
 
+  // Tiny one-shot flag the orphan-cleanup path sets so renderEmpty can
+  // surface a plain-English "your previous backup needs to be re-uploaded"
+  // line. Read-once; cleared as soon as it's shown.
+  function consumeBackupExpiredNotice() {
+    try {
+      if (sessionStorage.getItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired') === '1') {
+        sessionStorage.removeItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired');
+        return true;
+      }
+    } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
+    return false;
+  }
+
   function renderEmpty(mount) {
+    const expired = consumeBackupExpiredNotice();
+    const notice = expired
+      ? '<div class="settings-row__hint" style="margin-bottom:8px;">' +
+          'Your previous cloud backup couldn&rsquo;t be restored on this server. ' +
+          'Please re-upload your portfolio to refresh it.' +
+        '</div>'
+      : '';
     mount.innerHTML =
       '<div class="empty" style="padding:16px;">' +
+        notice +
         'No portfolio loaded in this browser. ' +
         '<a href="/settings#import">Import a T212 CSV →</a>' +
       '</div>';
   }
 
+  // Silently remove an unrecoverable cloud blob and re-render. The user
+  // sees the standard empty state with a soft one-liner — no jargon, no
+  // extra buttons. The decision to remove is safe: the blob is already
+  // permanently undecryptable, so we're cleaning up dead state, not
+  // discarding user data.
+  async function autoCleanStaleBlob(mount) {
+    try {
+      await window.CassandraSync.disableSync();
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.warn('cassandra.sync: auto-clean of stale blob failed', e);
+    }
+    try {
+      sessionStorage.setItem('cassandra.sync.backupExpired', '1');
+    } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
+    renderEmpty(mount);
+  }
+
   function renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status) {
     const lastSynced = status.updated_at
       ? new Date(status.updated_at).toISOString().replace('T', ' ').slice(0, 16) + ' UTC'
@@ -212,6 +250,12 @@
         savePie(pie);
         mountAndRender();
       } catch (e2) {
+        if (e2 && e2.name === 'StaleBlobError') {
+          // Pepper rotated since the blob was written — silently clean
+          // up and fall through to the empty state with a soft notice.
+          autoCleanStaleBlob(mount);
+          return;
+        }
         err.textContent = (e2 && e2.name === 'BadPinError')
           ? 'Incorrect PIN.'
           : (e2.message || 'Could not restore.');
@@ -417,7 +461,14 @@
         catch (e) { console.warn('sync status check failed', e); }
       }
       if (status && status.paid && status.exists) {
-        renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status);
+        if (status.orphaned) {
+          // Pepper rotated since the blob was written — clean up
+          // silently and show the standard empty state with a soft
+          // "please re-upload" notice.
+          autoCleanStaleBlob(mount);
+        } else {
+          renderRestoreFromCloud(mount, status);
+        }
       } else {
         renderEmpty(mount);
       }

app/templates/settings.html

@@ -256,7 +256,18 @@
       }
       const valueEl = statusEl.querySelector('.settings-row__value');
       actionsEl.innerHTML = '';
-      if (status.exists) {
+      if (status.exists && status.orphaned) {
+        // The stored blob can no longer be decrypted (server key rotated
+        // since it was written). The data is permanently unrecoverable,
+        // so silently clean up the dead row and re-render in the
+        // standard "off" state — leaving a soft one-liner so the user
+        // knows why they need to re-import.
+        try { await window.CassandraSync.disableSync(); }
+        catch (e) { console.warn('auto-clear stale sync failed', e); }
+        setFeedback('Your previous cloud backup couldn’t be restored. Re-import your portfolio to enable cloud sync again.', true);
+        await refresh();
+        return;
+      } else if (status.exists) {
         const when = status.updated_at
           ? new Date(status.updated_at).toISOString().replace('T', ' ').slice(0, 16) + ' UTC'
           : '—';