Lays the billing-prep spine before Paddle lands in D.3.
D.1 — referrals
- users.referral_code: unique 8-char URL-safe code (alphabet excludes the
ambiguous 0/O/1/I/L). Generated lazily on first /settings hit so existing
accounts pick one up without a backfill migration.
- users.referred_by_user_id + new referrals audit table (referrer,
referred, created_at, converted_at, credited_at). converted_at /
credited_at stay null until D.3 fills them via the Paddle webhook.
- POST /login accepts ?ref=<code>; the code rides on the signed
pending-verify cookie so it survives the GET → POST → /verify hop.
- /settings page: email, tier badge, referral code chip + invite link
with one-click copy, pending/converted/active-credits stats grid.
Settings nav link added to the top bar.
Reward shape: when the referred user makes their first paid Paddle
subscription, both they and the referrer get 50% off for 3 months.
(D.3 wires the actual credit application via the Paddle webhook.)
D.2 — paid-access gate
- users.credit_until: timestamp until which a free-tier account has
paid-tier access. Null = no credit. Populated by admin CLI now and the
D.3 webhook later.
- app.services.access exposes paid_status(user) → PaidStatus dataclass
(active / source / expires_at / days_remaining), is_paid_active() with
admin-bearer-token bypass, and a require_paid FastAPI dependency that
raises 402 Payment Required for free-tier callers.
- POST /api/analyze (portfolio AI commentary) gated behind require_paid.
- Settings page surfaces credit window when active ("free · credit · N
day(s) remaining (expires YYYY-MM-DD)") and the upgrade hint when not.
- Admin CLI: python -m app.cli {grant-credit,revoke-credit,show-status}.
grant-credit is idempotent — extends from max(now, current expiry) so
re-running the command never erodes an existing grant.
Migrations 0013 (referrals) and 0014 (credit_until). Tests cover the
paid-status truth table, code generation + normalisation, CLI argument
parsing, and the pending-cookie ref roundtrip (29 new tests).
289 lines
9.8 KiB
Python
289 lines
9.8 KiB
Python
"""Authentication routes: /login, /verify, /verify/resend, /logout.
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Cassandra is passwordless. Single auth flow:
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GET /login → enter email
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POST /login → get_or_create_user → issue OTP → send → 303 /verify
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GET /verify → enter 6-digit code (email shown from pending cookie)
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POST /verify → validate → set session → 303 /
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POST /verify/resend → reissue OTP (rate-limited)
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Signup and login are intentionally the same path — typing your email is
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sign-in if you've been here before, sign-up otherwise. No UI signal
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distinguishes the two, which also masks user-enumeration.
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The /signup endpoints from the previous auth scheme are gone. Anything
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that linked to /signup should now link to /login.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Form, Request
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.auth import (
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PENDING_COOKIE_NAME,
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PENDING_TTL_SECONDS,
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
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sign_pending,
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sign_session,
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verify_pending,
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)
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from app.config import get_settings
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from app.db import get_session, utcnow
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from app.logging import get_logger
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from app.services.auth_service import AuthError, get_or_create_user, get_user
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from app.services import otp_service, referral_service
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from app.services.email_service import EmailSendError, send_otp
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from app.templates_env import templates
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log = get_logger("auth_router")
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router = APIRouter(tags=["auth"])
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def _safe_next(next_value: str | None) -> str:
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"""Only allow same-origin relative paths to prevent open-redirect."""
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if not next_value or not next_value.startswith("/") or next_value.startswith("//"):
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return "/"
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if urlparse(next_value).netloc:
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return "/"
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return next_value
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def _set_session_cookie(response: RedirectResponse, user_id: int) -> None:
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response.set_cookie(
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key=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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value=sign_session(user_id),
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max_age=SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
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httponly=True,
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samesite="lax",
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secure=False,
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path="/",
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)
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def _set_pending_cookie(
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response: RedirectResponse,
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email: str,
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user_id: int,
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ref: str | None = None,
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) -> None:
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response.set_cookie(
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key=PENDING_COOKIE_NAME,
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value=sign_pending(email, user_id, ref=ref),
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max_age=PENDING_TTL_SECONDS,
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httponly=True,
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samesite="lax",
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secure=False,
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path="/",
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)
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def _clear_pending_cookie(response) -> None:
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response.delete_cookie(PENDING_COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
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async def _issue_and_send_otp(session: AsyncSession, email: str) -> bool:
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"""Generate a code, persist its hash, send the email. Returns True on
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success. Returns False (and logs) if SMTP submission fails — the OTP
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row is still created so the user can hit /verify/resend."""
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code = await otp_service.issue(session, email, purpose="auth")
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try:
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await send_otp(email, code, otp_service.OTP_TTL_MINUTES)
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return True
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except EmailSendError:
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return False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Login (email entry)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/login", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def login_page(
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request: Request,
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next: str | None = None,
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error: str | None = None,
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ref: str | None = None,
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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):
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# If a valid referral code is supplied, surface a small "invited"
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# banner. We resolve it server-side so the banner can show the
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# referrer's actual greeting (and a bad code silently degrades).
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ref_norm = referral_service.normalise_code(ref) if ref else None
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referrer = (
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await referral_service.lookup_referrer(session, ref_norm)
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if ref_norm else None
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)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request, "login.html",
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{
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"next_path": _safe_next(next),
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"error": error,
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"ref": ref_norm if referrer else None,
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"referrer_present": referrer is not None,
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},
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)
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@router.post("/login")
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async def login_submit(
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request: Request,
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email: str = Form(...),
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next: str | None = Form(default=None),
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ref: str | None = Form(default=None),
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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):
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s = get_settings()
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# Look up the referrer up front so a bad code doesn't pollute the
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# rest of the flow. Self-referral protection lives in
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# referral_service.link_new_user.
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ref_norm = referral_service.normalise_code(ref) if ref else None
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referrer = (
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await referral_service.lookup_referrer(session, ref_norm)
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if ref_norm else None
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)
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# Track whether THIS request creates the user row (i.e. a referral
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# capture window). Cleanest way: probe for existence first.
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from app.services.auth_service import get_user_by_email
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was_new = (await get_user_by_email(session, email)) is None
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try:
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user = await get_or_create_user(
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session, email, create_if_missing=s.CASSANDRA_SIGNUP_ENABLED,
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)
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except AuthError as e:
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request, "login.html",
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{"next_path": _safe_next(next), "error": str(e), "email": email,
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"ref": ref_norm if referrer else None,
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"referrer_present": referrer is not None},
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status_code=400,
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)
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# First-time signup with a valid referrer → persist the linkage now.
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# We do this BEFORE OTP-verify because the row is already created;
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# if the user abandons OTP we'll have an orphan link but that's
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# harmless audit data.
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if was_new and referrer is not None:
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await referral_service.link_new_user(session, user, referrer)
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# Issue OTP only if cooldown allows; if a fresh one was sent in the
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# last 60s we just reuse the existing one (silently) to avoid
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# spamming the user's inbox on a refreshed form submit.
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allowed, _ = await otp_service.can_request_new(session, user.email)
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if allowed:
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await _issue_and_send_otp(session, user.email)
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resp = RedirectResponse(url="/verify", status_code=303)
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# Stash the referral code on the pending cookie too — handy for
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# showing the "invited" badge on the /verify page so the friend
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# knows the discount is still tracking.
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_set_pending_cookie(
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resp, user.email, user.id,
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ref=ref_norm if referrer is not None else None,
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)
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return resp
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Verify (code entry)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/verify", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def verify_page(request: Request, error: str | None = None, sent: str | None = None):
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cookie = request.cookies.get(PENDING_COOKIE_NAME)
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pending = verify_pending(cookie) if cookie else None
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if pending is None:
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=303)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request, "verify.html",
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{"email": pending["email"], "error": error, "sent": sent,
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"ttl_minutes": otp_service.OTP_TTL_MINUTES,
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"resend_cooldown": otp_service.RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS},
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)
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@router.post("/verify")
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async def verify_submit(
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request: Request,
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code: str = Form(...),
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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):
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cookie = request.cookies.get(PENDING_COOKIE_NAME)
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pending = verify_pending(cookie) if cookie else None
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if pending is None:
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=303)
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email = pending["email"]
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try:
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await otp_service.verify(session, email, code)
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except otp_service.OTPError as e:
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request, "verify.html",
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{"email": email, "error": str(e),
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"ttl_minutes": otp_service.OTP_TTL_MINUTES,
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"resend_cooldown": otp_service.RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS},
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status_code=400,
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)
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user = await get_user(session, pending["uid"])
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if user is None:
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# User row vanished between cookie issue and verify. Restart flow.
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=303)
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user.last_login_at = utcnow()
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await session.commit()
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log.info("user.login", user_id=user.id, email=email)
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resp = RedirectResponse(url="/", status_code=303)
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_set_session_cookie(resp, user.id)
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_clear_pending_cookie(resp)
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return resp
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@router.post("/verify/resend")
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async def verify_resend(
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request: Request,
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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):
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cookie = request.cookies.get(PENDING_COOKIE_NAME)
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pending = verify_pending(cookie) if cookie else None
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if pending is None:
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=303)
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email = pending["email"]
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allowed, wait = await otp_service.can_request_new(session, email)
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if not allowed:
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return RedirectResponse(
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url=f"/verify?error=Please+wait+{wait}s+before+requesting+another+code",
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status_code=303,
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)
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ok = await _issue_and_send_otp(session, email)
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msg = "A new code has been sent" if ok else "Could not send email — try again shortly"
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return RedirectResponse(url=f"/verify?sent={msg}", status_code=303)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Logout
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.post("/logout")
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async def logout(request: Request):
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resp = RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=303)
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resp.delete_cookie(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
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_clear_pending_cookie(resp)
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return resp
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@router.get("/logout")
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async def logout_get(request: Request):
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return await logout(request)
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