Networking: the superadmin console now mirrors `app` instead of a loopback-only host port. Base compose drops the host port; the dev override binds 127.0.0.1:8091; the prod overlay joins the `intranet` network and listens on :80 with --proxy-headers so NPM can proxy it. CLI: add `purge-test-users` (dry-run by default, --commit to delete, --keep allow-list defaulting to the real accounts). Deletes child rows explicitly (DB-agnostic) plus email-keyed OTPs, so smoke-test signups that were pointed at prod can be cleaned repeatably instead of via ad-hoc SQL. Covered by 6 new tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
66 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
# Production overlay. Applied on the VPS with:
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#
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# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
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#
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# Drops the host port binding entirely and joins the `intranet` external
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# Docker network so a front-side proxy (Nginx Proxy Manager) on the same
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# network can reach the container directly. The app listens on port 80
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# inside the container so NPM upstreams are uniform across services
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# (always `<container-name>:80`).
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#
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# The local-dev compose (just `docker-compose.yml` alone) still binds to
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# the host port from `.env` / CASSANDRA_PORT — unchanged.
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services:
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app:
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# --proxy-headers makes Starlette honour X-Forwarded-Proto / -For from
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# NPM, so request.url_for() generates https:// URLs (otherwise static
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# asset links render as http://… and browsers block as mixed content).
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# --forwarded-allow-ips=* is safe here: the container has no host port,
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# only the intranet bridge reaches it.
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command: ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "80",
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"--workers", "1", "--proxy-headers", "--forwarded-allow-ips=*"]
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expose:
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- "80"
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networks:
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- default
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- intranet
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# The shared `intranet` network has many other containers aliased as
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# `db` and `redis`; Docker's embedded DNS would pick one of those
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# before ours. Use the project-prefixed container names instead —
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# those are globally unique on the daemon.
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environment:
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DATABASE_URL: mysql+aiomysql://${MARIADB_USER:-cassandra}:${MARIADB_PASSWORD:-changeme}@readmarkets-db-1:3306/${MARIADB_DATABASE:-cassandra}
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REDIS_URL: redis://readmarkets-redis-1:6379/0
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scheduler:
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# Scheduler isn't fronted by NPM, so it doesn't need intranet — but
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# it does share the same DNS-collision problem on `default` (it only
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# joins `default`, where our `db` alias would normally win… except
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# the scheduler too is multi-network if you ever decide to expose
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# its health endpoint via NPM). Future-proofing: use the explicit
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# container names here too.
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environment:
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DATABASE_URL: mysql+aiomysql://${MARIADB_USER:-cassandra}:${MARIADB_PASSWORD:-changeme}@readmarkets-db-1:3306/${MARIADB_DATABASE:-cassandra}
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REDIS_URL: redis://readmarkets-redis-1:6379/0
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admin:
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# Fronted by NPM like `app`: listen on 80 and join the `intranet` network
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# so the proxy can reach it as `readmarkets-admin-1:80`. No host port.
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# --proxy-headers so redirect/asset URLs honour X-Forwarded-Proto from NPM.
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# Still gated by ADMIN_CONSOLE_PASSWORD; add an NPM access rule in front for
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# a second layer. Project-prefixed DB name avoids the shared-network `db`
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# DNS collision (same reason as app/scheduler).
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command: ["uvicorn", "admin.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "80",
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"--workers", "1", "--proxy-headers", "--forwarded-allow-ips=*"]
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expose:
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- "80"
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networks:
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- default
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- intranet
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environment:
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DATABASE_URL: mysql+aiomysql://${MARIADB_USER:-cassandra}:${MARIADB_PASSWORD:-changeme}@readmarkets-db-1:3306/${MARIADB_DATABASE:-cassandra}
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networks:
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intranet:
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external: true
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