read.markets/app/auth.py
Giorgio Gilestro 480fd311c5 phase A: user accounts + session-cookie auth
Replaces the static bearer-token gate with a real auth boundary. The
existing CASSANDRA_TOKEN path is retained as an admin / scripting escape
hatch — kept compatible by aliasing require_token to require_auth.

- New users table (migration 0007): email, argon2 password_hash, tier,
  email_verified (declared but not enforced until phase E), settings_json
  for the tone/analysis/anchor knobs we'll wire in phase D.
- app/services/auth_service.py: argon2-cffi password hashing with timing-
  attack-resistant authenticate() (always runs a hash verify even on
  unknown-email to deny a username-enumeration oracle).
- app/auth.py rewritten: require_auth returns a CurrentUser with either
  is_admin=True (bearer path) or a User object (session path). Failing
  requests get 303 → /login for HTML, 401 for API. Sessions signed with
  itsdangerous against CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET; 14-day TTL.
- app/routers/auth.py: /login, /signup, /logout. Login form preserves the
  ?next=… param for redirect-after-login. Signup respects a new
  CASSANDRA_SIGNUP_ENABLED flag.
- Standalone /login + /signup templates (no app chrome). base.html grows
  a user chip + logout link in the header (reads request.state.current_user).

Phase A's main known limitations are documented in the plan: email
verification is declared but not enforced; session revocation is
best-effort (cookie-only, not DB-backed). Both land in phase E.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 11:12:10 +01:00

139 lines
4.8 KiB
Python

"""Request-level authentication.
Two paths accepted:
1. **Session cookie** (`cassandra_session`) — set by /login. Signed with
`CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET` via itsdangerous; carries just the user id.
On each request we deserialise, then load the User from the DB so the
tier value is always fresh.
2. **Bearer token** (`Authorization: Bearer …`) — the legacy single-user
path kept as an admin/dev escape hatch and for programmatic API access
(CLI, curl, scripts). Matches `CASSANDRA_TOKEN` if set.
If neither matches:
- HTML requests get 303 → /login
- API / curl-style requests get 401
For backwards-compat, `require_token` is an alias for `require_auth` so
existing routers that do `dependencies=[Depends(require_token)]` keep
working without edit.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import secrets
from dataclasses import dataclass
from fastapi import Header, HTTPException, Request, status
from itsdangerous import BadSignature, SignatureExpired, URLSafeTimedSerializer
from app.config import get_settings
from app.db import get_session_factory
from app.models import User
from app.services.auth_service import get_user
SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "cassandra_session"
SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60 # 14 days
@dataclass
class CurrentUser:
"""The authenticated principal for the current request.
`user` is None when the bearer token was used (admin/dev path with no
matching DB row). Routes that need per-user scoping should check
`is_admin` and either use a sentinel admin scope or 403."""
is_admin: bool
user: User | None
@property
def id(self) -> int | None:
return self.user.id if self.user else None
@property
def email(self) -> str | None:
return self.user.email if self.user else None
def _serializer() -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:
s = get_settings()
secret = s.CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET or s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN or "dev-insecure-secret"
return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret, salt="cassandra-session-v1")
def sign_session(user_id: int) -> str:
return _serializer().dumps({"uid": int(user_id)})
def verify_session(cookie: str) -> int | None:
try:
data = _serializer().loads(cookie, max_age=SESSION_TTL_SECONDS)
return int(data["uid"])
except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _wants_html(request: Request) -> bool:
accept = request.headers.get("accept", "").lower()
# Treat a missing Accept header as HTML for browser navigations.
if not accept:
return True
return "text/html" in accept and "application/json" not in accept
async def require_auth(
request: Request,
authorization: str | None = Header(default=None),
) -> CurrentUser:
"""Resolve the current authenticated principal. Raises HTTPException
on failure (303 redirect to /login for HTML, 401 for API)."""
s = get_settings()
# --- 1) Bearer token (admin / dev / scripts) ---
if s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN and authorization and authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
provided = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1].strip()
if secrets.compare_digest(provided.encode(), s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN.encode()):
principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=True, user=None)
request.state.current_user = principal
return principal
# --- 2) Session cookie (browser) ---
cookie = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
if cookie:
uid = verify_session(cookie)
if uid is not None:
async with get_session_factory()() as db_session:
user = await get_user(db_session, uid)
if user is not None:
principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=False, user=user)
request.state.current_user = principal
return principal
# --- 3) Unauthenticated ---
if _wants_html(request):
# Preserve the originally-requested path so /login can redirect back.
path = request.url.path
if request.url.query:
path += "?" + request.url.query
return _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path=path)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Authentication required",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
def _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path: str = "/") -> None:
# Some pages (login itself) are paths a redirect loop would be silly
# to send back to. The auth router opts out of this dependency
# entirely, so we don't need to filter here.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER,
detail="Login required",
headers={"Location": f"/login?next={next_path}"},
)
# Backwards compatibility: every existing router uses Depends(require_token).
require_token = require_auth