Server no longer holds portfolios. Holdings live in the browser (localStorage); the server publishes an anonymous ticker_universe and a gzipped /api/universe payload identical for every authenticated user, so access patterns can't betray which tickers a user holds. AI commentary is generated ephemerally from the browser-supplied pie and the cost ledger row records no positions. Migrations 0009-0011 added the universe table and dropped positions / portfolio_snapshots / portfolios. Authentication is now e-mail OTP only. Migration 0010 dropped password_hash and email_verified (every active session is by construction proof of email control). The /signup endpoint is gone; signup and login share a single email-entry page. Email rendering is HTML+plain-text multipart with a shared brand palette (app/branding.py) asserted in sync with the CSS by a drift-detection test. LLM provider defaults to DeepSeek-direct (cheaper, api.deepseek.com) with OpenRouter as automatic fallback if DeepSeek fails. ai_log_job and indicator_summary_job now iterate the two tones (NOVICE, INTERMEDIATE) per cycle so the dashboard's tone toggle is instant; PROMPT_VERSION bumped to 6 with an educational anti-TA / anti-gambling stance baked into _CORE. NOVICE mode renders a curated glossary inline (CBOE VIX, yield curve, HY OAS, etc.) with JS-positioned tooltips that survive viewport edges and sticky bars. Model name and tokens hidden from the user UI; still recorded in StrategicLog.model and AICall for admin. Layout adds a sticky top nav, a sticky bottom markets bar (one chip per exchange with status LED + headline index + 1d change), and Phase H feedback reporting is queued in tasks/todo.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
165 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
165 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
"""Request-level authentication.
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Two paths accepted:
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1. **Session cookie** (`cassandra_session`) — set by /login. Signed with
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`CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET` via itsdangerous; carries just the user id.
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On each request we deserialise, then load the User from the DB so the
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tier value is always fresh.
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2. **Bearer token** (`Authorization: Bearer …`) — the legacy single-user
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path kept as an admin/dev escape hatch and for programmatic API access
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(CLI, curl, scripts). Matches `CASSANDRA_TOKEN` if set.
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If neither matches:
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- HTML requests get 303 → /login
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- API / curl-style requests get 401
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For backwards-compat, `require_token` is an alias for `require_auth` so
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existing routers that do `dependencies=[Depends(require_token)]` keep
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working without edit.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from fastapi import Header, HTTPException, Request, status
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from itsdangerous import BadSignature, SignatureExpired, URLSafeTimedSerializer
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from app.config import get_settings
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from app.db import get_session_factory
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from app.models import User
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from app.services.auth_service import get_user
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "cassandra_session"
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SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60 # 14 days
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# Short-lived cookie set during signup / unverified-login. Carries the email
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# under verification so the /verify page knows who's verifying without making
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# the user retype the address. NOT an auth cookie — never grants access to
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# anything beyond /verify and /verify/resend.
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PENDING_COOKIE_NAME = "cassandra_pending"
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PENDING_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60 # 1 hour
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@dataclass
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class CurrentUser:
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"""The authenticated principal for the current request.
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`user` is None when the bearer token was used (admin/dev path with no
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matching DB row). Routes that need per-user scoping should check
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`is_admin` and either use a sentinel admin scope or 403."""
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is_admin: bool
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user: User | None
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@property
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def id(self) -> int | None:
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return self.user.id if self.user else None
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@property
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def email(self) -> str | None:
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return self.user.email if self.user else None
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def _serializer() -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:
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s = get_settings()
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secret = s.CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET or s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN or "dev-insecure-secret"
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return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret, salt="cassandra-session-v1")
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def sign_session(user_id: int) -> str:
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return _serializer().dumps({"uid": int(user_id)})
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def verify_session(cookie: str) -> int | None:
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try:
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data = _serializer().loads(cookie, max_age=SESSION_TTL_SECONDS)
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return int(data["uid"])
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except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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def _pending_serializer() -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:
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s = get_settings()
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secret = s.CASSANDRA_SESSION_SECRET or s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN or "dev-insecure-secret"
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return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret, salt="cassandra-pending-v1")
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def sign_pending(email: str, user_id: int) -> str:
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return _pending_serializer().dumps({"email": email, "uid": int(user_id)})
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def verify_pending(cookie: str) -> dict | None:
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"""Returns {"email": str, "uid": int} or None if signature/expiry bad."""
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try:
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data = _pending_serializer().loads(cookie, max_age=PENDING_TTL_SECONDS)
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return {"email": str(data["email"]), "uid": int(data["uid"])}
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except (BadSignature, SignatureExpired, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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def _wants_html(request: Request) -> bool:
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accept = request.headers.get("accept", "").lower()
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# Treat a missing Accept header as HTML for browser navigations.
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if not accept:
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return True
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return "text/html" in accept and "application/json" not in accept
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async def require_auth(
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request: Request,
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authorization: str | None = Header(default=None),
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) -> CurrentUser:
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"""Resolve the current authenticated principal. Raises HTTPException
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on failure (303 redirect to /login for HTML, 401 for API)."""
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s = get_settings()
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# --- 1) Bearer token (admin / dev / scripts) ---
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if s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN and authorization and authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
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provided = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1].strip()
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if secrets.compare_digest(provided.encode(), s.CASSANDRA_TOKEN.encode()):
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=True, user=None)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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# --- 2) Session cookie (browser) ---
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cookie = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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if cookie:
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uid = verify_session(cookie)
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if uid is not None:
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async with get_session_factory()() as db_session:
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user = await get_user(db_session, uid)
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if user is not None:
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principal = CurrentUser(is_admin=False, user=user)
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request.state.current_user = principal
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return principal
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# --- 3) Unauthenticated ---
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if _wants_html(request):
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# Preserve the originally-requested path so /login can redirect back.
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path = request.url.path
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if request.url.query:
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path += "?" + request.url.query
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return _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path=path)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Authentication required",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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def _raise_redirect_to_login(next_path: str = "/") -> None:
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# Some pages (login itself) are paths a redirect loop would be silly
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# to send back to. The auth router opts out of this dependency
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# entirely, so we don't need to filter here.
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER,
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detail="Login required",
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headers={"Location": f"/login?next={next_path}"},
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)
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# Backwards compatibility: every existing router uses Depends(require_token).
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require_token = require_auth
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