sync: encrypted cloud backup for portfolios + settings UX rework
Adds opt-in client-side-encrypted portfolio sync (paid). Browser
PBKDF2(PIN) → AES-GCM, server HKDF(pepper, user_id) outer wrap;
server stores opaque bytes only. Sliding-window rate limit on GET.
- new portfolio_sync table (migration 0015)
- POST/GET/DELETE /api/portfolio/sync + /status
- app/services/portfolio_sync.py crypto + rate limit
- app/routers/sync.py paid-gated
- app/static/js/portfolio-sync.js WebCrypto wrapper
- settings page: enable/disable + PIN modal
- PORTFOLIO_SYNC_PEPPER setting (warn on startup if missing)
Settings + import rework:
- /upload merged into /settings#import (legacy route 302s)
- drop CSV → auto-parse → preview → Import only / Import & sync
- nav slimmed to Dashboard / News / Log
- Settings + Logout moved to a user dropdown
- brand logo links to /
Collateral fixes:
- settings 500: re-fetch User in current session before mutating
referral_code (assign_code_if_missing was refreshing a User
loaded in the auth dep's now-closed session)
- csv_import: distinct error for unfunded T212 pies (all qty=0)
- db.py: drop pool_pre_ping (aiomysql 0.3.2 incompat); pin
isolation_level=READ COMMITTED to avoid gap-lock deadlocks
- alembic env: disable_existing_loggers=False so in-process
migrations don't silence uvicorn's loggers
- docker-compose.override.yml: dev-only volume mount + --reload
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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23 changed files with 1637 additions and 95 deletions
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@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ from sqlalchemy import (
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ForeignKey,
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Index,
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Integer,
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LargeBinary,
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SmallInteger,
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String,
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Text,
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UniqueConstraint,
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@ -179,6 +181,31 @@ class User(Base):
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)
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class PortfolioSync(Base):
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"""Opt-in encrypted backup of a user's pie. Stored as opaque bytes:
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the client encrypts the pie with a PIN-derived key (AES-GCM), and the
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server wraps that ciphertext again with a per-user key derived from
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PORTFOLIO_SYNC_PEPPER + user_id (also AES-GCM). A DB-only leak yields
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nothing usable without the env-only pepper; a pepper-only leak still
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leaves the attacker brute-forcing the PIN through PBKDF2(600k).
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One row per user. Absent row = sync disabled for that user. The
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fetch_window_* fields drive a sliding-window rate limit on GET so the
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pepper-leak threat model can't degenerate into an unthrottled brute
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force against the inner PBKDF2."""
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__tablename__ = "portfolio_sync"
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user_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(
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ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), primary_key=True,
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)
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outer_ciphertext: Mapped[bytes] = mapped_column(LargeBinary, nullable=False)
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outer_nonce: Mapped[bytes] = mapped_column(LargeBinary, nullable=False)
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version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(SmallInteger, nullable=False, default=1)
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created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
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updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
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fetch_window_start: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
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fetch_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
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class Referral(Base):
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"""One row per captured (referrer, referred) pair. Created at signup
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when the new user supplied a valid `?ref=<code>`. The conversion
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